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On August 28, 2005, there was an article on the homepage
of the German magazine Spiegel Online that began:
Hurricane Katrina has become a “monster” storm. Lo-
cal authorities classified it as a Category 5 storm, the
most intense category. This afternoon the mayor of New
Orleans ordered the compulsory evacuation of the city.
Katrina could become the most dangerous storm that has
ever haunted the United States.
Imagine that you are a citizen of New Orleans and the storm
is approaching. You have to decide whether or not to leave
your home as recommended by the mayor. Would you leave
all your belongings behind? Your furniture? Your new busi-
ness? Would you use statistics to inform yourself about the
probability of the total destruction of dams and the flooding
of the city? Would you think about how you have previous-
ly decided in risky situations? Or would you start thinking
about how to reduce the potential damage, maybe by in-
stalling additional security devices, like sealing the doors and
windows or getting hold of emergency power supplies?
Psychological research on decision making under un-
certainty looks for answers to these and related questions.
Whereas previous research in this domain concentrated on
probabilities of risky outcomes in lottery-type decisions
(Jungermann, Pfister, & Fischer, 2004), an alternative ap-
proach studies decisions in quasi-realistic settings (e.g., Hu-
ber, 2004). When working on quasi-realistic decision prob-
lems, subjects are not interested in event probabilities, but
asked about additional actions they would take that could
reduce the potential risk or even eliminate it. The concept
of active risk defusing states that such additional actions fa-
vor a decision to select the more risky option. This is in line
with non-experimental decision-making research (Lipshitz
& Strauss, 1997; March & Shapira, 1987; Shapira, 1995) as
well as research on risk and controllability (Vlek & Stallen,
1980; Weinstein, 1984). For example, Vlek and Stallen (p.
287) showed that controllable risks are judged to be less
risky, concluding: “Controllability of decision conse-
quences seems to be one of the most important psycholog-
ical factors in personal risk experience.” Yates (1992) re-
ported that decision makers try to create new options to
reduce risk without sacrificing advantages. Payne, Bettman,
and Johnson (1993) demonstrated such an adaptation to the
particular risky situation by referring to the dependence of
decision making on only minor task or context modifica-
tions. They referred to the decision makers’ ability to adapt
their strategy to different circumstances. The concept of risk-
defusing operators (RDOs) describes decision makers’con-
trol or adaption strategies: In the hurricane example, the pos-
sibility of installing safeguards and taking other protective
measures as risk defusers may have led some New Orleans
citizens to decide to remain in the city despite the dire warn-
ings. Such decision making can be seen as a consequence
of RDOs. An RDO is defined as an “action, which a deci-
sion maker initiates in addition to the given options with the
intention to reduce the risk of such an alternative” (Huber,
2004, p. 130). There are three different kinds of RDOs (e.g.,
Huber, 1997; Huber, Beutter, Montoya, & Huber, 2001):
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1. New alternatives: search for alternatives to the options
presented, whereby the alternatives share the positive as-
pects – but not the negative consequences – of the op-
tions presented (e.g., using biological instead of chemi-
cal pest control).
2. Possibilities for control: check whether the risk of neg-
ative consequences can be reduced by either preventing
the negative event from happening or breaking the causal
link between the event and its negative consequences
(e.g., wearing protective clothing at dangerous work-
places).
3. Worst-case plans: search for action plans that would neu-
tralize negative consequences should they occur (e.g.,
backing up important files or buying insurance).
These RDOs are indicators of the cognitive process of de-
cision making. For worst-case plans, besides the mental ef-
fort involved, additional costs arise, for example, time
(backing up the data) or money (paying for insurance). The
RDO new alternatives differs from the other two operators
because it characterizes risk management in terms of an en-
largement of the problem space. The other two RDO vari-
ants can be seen as active risk management. Huber et al.
(2001, p. 411) comment: “Thus, risk defusing can be at-
tempted in two ways: (a) by reducing the probability of the
negative outcome, and (b) by transforming the negative out-
come into an outcome state with a higher utility. Both ways
increase the expected utility of the alternative.” Subsequent
articles by these authors only refer to the two general strate-
gies of pre- and post-RDOs, which contribute to the pre-
vention of or compensation for the damage (e.g., Huber,
2004; Huber & Huber, 2003). Our study, however, will use
the differentiation explained above.
To analyze decision-making behavior in everyday risk
situations, Huber, Wider, and Huber (1997) used the method
of active information search (AIS). In this procedure, par-
ticipants can pose questions to the experimenter to receive
more information about two alternative actions in a written
quasi-realistic risky scenario. A description of the method
and empirical results from its application can be found in
Huber (1997, 2004), Huber et al. (1997), Huber et al. (2001),
as well as in Huber and Macho (2001). Because we used
this technique in our own study, a short description can al-
so be found below.
In classical decision-making research, the subjective
value of consequences and the subjective probability of their
occurrence are essential for the decision maker (Edwards,
1954, 1961). This position differs from the assumptions
about the decision-making process in the quasi-realistic
risky situations used by Huber (2004). In Huber’s situations,
a comparison of participants’ decision-making behavior
when they are provided with all the information they need
(e.g., in the lottery experiments in classical decision-mak-
ing research) with that when they are to request additional
information from the experimenter (as in the AIS method)
shows that most decision makers do not request informa-
tion concerning probabilities. Huber and colleagues con-
cluded that classical decision-making tasks induce the use
of probability information by the way the information is
presented. In quasi-realistic tasks, the information about po-
tential negative consequences suffices. Furthermore, the
majority of decision makers even search for additional ac-
tions which could reduce the probability of the incidence
of risky events (Huber, 1997; Huber et al., 1997; Huber et
al., 2001; Huber & Macho, 2001). Active risk-defusing be-
havior seems to play the more important role in decision
making. 
The question concerning the conditions under which
which type of RDO will be used is still open (Huber, 2004).
Studies have demonstrated substantial differences in the
number of questions posed, that is, in the frequency of
searching for different RDO types in different scenarios
(e.g., Huber et al., 1997; Huber et al., 2001). There is a clear
need for the development of a theory that explains decision-
making behavior in different situations, that is, why deci-
sion makers show different decision-making behavior in
different types of situations. A typology of risky situations
would be helpful: It would provide us with a formal char-
acterization of task types as well as a comparison of deci-
sion-making behavior in different types of situations so that
we could determine whether risk-defusing behavior is a
universal feature of decision making under uncertainty. To
this end, the first step is the classification of risks (see pi-
lot study below).
The literature suggests the existence of domain-specific
differences in decision-making behavior. Huber and Macho
(2001), for example, showed that more questions concern-
ing probability were asked in the domain of medicine than
in the domains of social issues and business. This is in ac-
cordance with results concerning naturalistic decision mak-
ing about domain-specific strategies used in the decision-
making process (Payne et al., 1993; Pennington & Hastie,
1993; Rettinger & Hastie, 2001; Schmitt & Klein, 1998).
But research on such differences in the RDO search is still
lacking. Therefore, we want to study this question more
closely and look for differences in the search for RDOs de-
pending on risk domain and type of risk. Our intention is to
find out how strongly those factors affect the search for dif-
ferent RDO types.
Pilot Study
In order to investigate the search for RDOs in different types
of risky situations, we needed a formal classification of
risks. We started with the risk typology of the German Ad-
visory Council on Global Change (Wissenschaftlicher
Beirat der Bundesregierung Globale Umweltrisiken
[WBGU], 1999). This typology, formulated by experts,
characterizes the threat of risks using several criteria: prob-
ability of occurrence, extent of damage, certainty of as-
sessment, persistency, irreversibility, and delay effect. We
were interested in how non-experts would rate different
risks using these criteria and which criteria they would con-
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sider relevant when rating risks. In our pilot study, we asked
20 participants (eight female; mean age 26 years) to rate 57
risk situations using the WBGU criteria. Each risk situation
was to be rated along the six dimensions mentioned above
on a scale from 0 to 4 (= maximum). Using cluster analy-
sis, we found evidence for four different types of risk, which
can be described as follows (whereby the order roughly fol-
lows an intuitive classification on the basis of event sever-
ity): 
1. Normal risks: calculable risks involving damage that is
expected to be reversible and whose extent is low (e.g.,
German measles, light flooding, borrowing money).
2. Medium risks: risks with a medium rating based on the
WBGU criteria (e.g., carcinogenic substances like as-
bestos, waste disposal, stock investments).
3. Catastrophic risks: risks involving a great deal of dam-
age for which the time lag between the triggering event
and its consequences is short (e.g., avian flu pandemic,
volcanic explosion, terrorist attack).
4. Global risks: risks involving a great deal of damage that
are expected to be irreversible and have a very long re-
moval period (e.g., genetically modified food products,
extinction of endangered species, global warming).
This four-cluster solution portrays the classification of risks
according to the understanding of non-experts. Besides
these four types of risks, three different domains were dis-
tinguished: (a) ecology (e.g., flooding), (b) health (e.g., car-
cinogenic substances), and (c) economics/politics (e.g., ter-
rorist attack). In the following, we will analyze the
relationship between the three risk domains and the four
types of risk.
Main Study
On the Risk Specificity of Active Risk-
Defusing Behavior
The present paper discusses the question of the risk speci-
ficity of decision-making behavior in quasi-realistic sce-
narios. Decision making is similar to problem solving in
that the construction of a mental representation of the giv-
en situation is essential. The mental representation resem-
bles a complex system with causal relations between ex-
ternal events and consequences. Relations involving the
decision maker’s activities imply a kind of controllability
and are of particular interest. They negate the causal con-
nection between the risk situation and its negative conse-
quences. We need to investigate under what conditions what
kind of relationship (i.e., RDO) is preferred (Huber, 2004).
The central questions are: (a) Does the search for an RDO
depend on the type of risk situation? and (b) What type of
RDO will be searched for? More precisely, do decision mak-
ers search for different RDOs in different types of risk sit-
uations?
In our attempt to answer these questions, we relied on
Huber et al.’s (2001) threefold differentiation of RDOs: new
alternatives, possibilities for control, and worst-case plans.
By analyzing the relationship between the RDO search
process and clearly defined types of risk, we will specify
and extend Huber’s approach: The scope and relevance of
the theory, which up to now has only been tested in normal
risk situations, will be evaluated for more global risk situ-
ations.
Main Research Questions and Hypotheses
Based on the typology of risks presented above, we formu-
lated the following general hypothesis: The interest in dif-
ferent RDOs during decision making depends on the type
of risk specified. In other words, while participants think
aloud, the type and number of questions they pose and state-
ments they make about different RDOs (new alternatives,
possibilities for control, or worst-case plans) will vary de-
pending on type of risk.
As for the use of RDOs, we have specific expectations
for the different types of risks. The combination of the clas-
sification criteria (see pilot study) resulted in the following
hypotheses for each type of risk: 
1. We assumed that decision making would be easiest for
the normal type of risk because it is calculable, involves
damage that is reversible and whose extent is low. This
type of risk was viewed as a kind of control group. For
this type of risk, we did not expect to observe specific
preferences for one of the RDOs.
2. In the event of a medium type of risk, in other words,
when decision makers expected the damage to be of
medium extent, largely restorable, to have a medium-
term removal period, a medium-level certainty of as-
sessment, and the time lag between the triggering event
and the damage to be medium-long, we predicted that
decision makers would request alternatives to the options
provided. This search for alternative options is very sim-
ilar to the RDO new alternatives. We therefore expected
questions and statements to most frequently concern new
alternatives.
3. We assumed that there would be a high amount of pres-
sure to act in light of a catastrophic type of risk, in oth-
er words, when decision makers expected the damage to
be extensive and only partially restorable, and the time
lag between the triggering event and the damage to be
short. In this case, decision makers may judge the po-
tential for reducing or eliminating negative conse-
quences to be very low. We thus predicted that they would
focus more on compensating for potential negative con-
sequences. Accordingly, we expected questions and
statements to most frequently involve worst-case plans. 
4. For the global type of risk, in other words, when deci-
sion makers expected the damage to have a very long re-
moval period, to be irreversible, and the situation high-
ly complex, we predicted that decision makers would be
interested in coping with negative consequences by
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means of preventive actions. Thus, we expected ques-
tions and statements to most frequently concern possi-
bilities for control.
Exploratory Research Questions
We know from previous research (e.g., Huber & Huber,
2003) that information besides searching for RDO might
be important for the decision-making process. Therefore,
we wanted to explore different aspects to gain ideas for fur-
ther improvements in the theory.
Background knowledge and prior experience
Because the risk situations in our study (especially our cat-
astrophic and global types of risk) extend beyond the every-
day risks that Huber studied, we wanted to check the role
of prior experience and background knowledge in the de-
cision-making process. There are clear data on the role of
prior experience and expertise in decision making (e.g., El-
terson, Shanteau, & Krogstad, 1987; Weiss & Shanteau,
2003). We assumed that it would be activated in connection
with RDOs throughout the different types of risk. For ex-
ample, prior experience with negative events such as flood-
ing is related to the intention to buy natural catastrophe in-
surance (Kunreuther et al., 1978; Zaleskiewicz, Piskorz, &
Borkowska, 2002). Ranyard, Hinkley, and Williamson
(2001) found that risk management strategies in buying con-
sumables using credit depended on prior experience and
emotional reactions. We expected statements concerning
specific background knowledge and prior experience to be
important elements for the decision maker. This is in line
with Huber and colleagues (Huber, 2004; Huber et al., 1997;
Huber et al., 2001), who mentioned the potential role of
background knowledge and experience with respect to the
subjective representation of the situation and to the search
for RDOs.
Attitudes and values
Based on experiences from our pilot study, it seemed use-
ful to take into account our participants’ general attitudes
and values (e.g., plans, rules, and basic principles), which
are independent of the particular scenario, but help partic-
ipants make decisions. An example could be the opinion
that “One should never interfere with nature’s plans.” This
basic principle would support decisions concerning health
problems and ecology. Decision making might be based on
general attitudes and values for the global type of risk more
frequently than for other types of risk.
Situation, probabilities, negative and positive
consequences
Following Huber et al.’s (1997, 2001) category system, we
analyzed type-specific differences in decisions about risk
with respect to the frequency of questions and statements
in the categories of probabilities, cost-benefit, and the gen-
eral situation (see Table 2).
Choice of alternatives




A total of 120 individuals (64 women, 56 men) participat-
ed in our study. Their mean age was 30.1 years. Nearly half
the participants were employed (with and without univer-
sity-level education); the others were schoolchildren and
college students. None of them had participated in previous
studies on decision making. All materials were presented
in German (the participants’ first language).
Design
Two independent variables were used for our main study.
The first one was the type of risk (normal, medium, cata-
strophic, and global), the second represented the risk do-
mains (ecology, health, and politics/economics), resulting
in a 4 × 3 within-subjects design. Factor levels were oper-
ationalized by the content of risky scenarios. For each of
the four types of risk, we chose examples from the three
risk domains (ecology, health, and politics/economics). 
A complete design would have required participants to
evaluate all 12 scenarios. Following Ranyard, Williamson,
and Cuthbert’s (1999) recommendation, we decided to use
an incomplete design by reducing participants’ load to the
evaluation of three scenarios. We selected one scenario from
each domain for each participant, whereby each of the three
scenarios corresponded to a different type of risk. So, data
from a total of 360 evaluations were collected (120 partic-
ipants with three scenarios each). The four types of risk were
each covered by 90 evaluations; the three risk domains were
each covered by 120 evaluations. For all participants, the
sequence in which the risk domains were presented was held
constant (health, economics/politics, ecology), but the se-
quence in which the types of risk were presented was var-
ied. Huber and Huber (2003) as well as Huber and Macho
(2001) found no sequence effects in their scenarios. There-
fore, we decided to keep the sequence of risk domains con-
stant.
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The number of questions and statements related to the
three types of RDOs (new alternatives, possibilities for con-
trol, and worst-case plans) served as a dependent variable.
We used a category system (see below) to quantify them.
Material
Short descriptions of each scenario were presented to the
participants. We ensured that the selected scenarios did not
overlap in content. The resulting 12 scenarios and their clas-
sification according to type of risk and risk domain are
shown in Table 1.
was developed by Ranyard et al. (1999; see also Williamson,
Ranyard, & Cuthbert, 2000) and is based on Ranyard and
Craig’s (1995) interview techniques. The conversation-
based version can be seen as a modification of the AIS. The
difference between the C-AIS and Huber et al.’s (1997)AIS
lies in the role of the experimenter, who acts as an inter-
viewer and gives verbal (instead of written) answers that
are read from standardized templates. This version has the
advantage of creating a more natural social interaction, but
also disadvantages due to problems in verbalizing and ex-
perimenter effects. To avoid any of the known potential dis-
advantages, the experimenters underwent interviewer train-
ing. The interview was non-directive, that is, conducted
without any evaluative comments or statements. Questions
for which there were no answers in the answer templates
were answered spontaneously depending on the context and
immediately added to the template. In some cases, the ex-
perimenter answered, “There is no information available.”
To further reduce experimenter effects, we followed the rec-
ommendation given by Ranyard et al. (1999), Williamson
et al. (2000), and Huber et al. (2001) to use standardized
statements like “What do you mean exactly?” or “Could
you please pose the question in more concrete terms?” (in
order to elicit a more specific question) and “What are you
thinking about right now?” (to elicit thinking aloud when a
participant had been silent for over 1 min).
Williamson et al. (2000) showed that C-AIS is a well-
suited process-tracing method that, unlike thinking aloud
techniques, does not provoke reactivity. We thus selected it
as our basic method. According to Huber et al. (1997) and
Williamson et al., the C-AIS can be combined with think-
ing aloud, following Ericsson and Simon (1980, 1993). The
thinking aloud instruction asks participants to verbalize all
ideas they have while working on the task, so that their cog-
nitive processes can be assessed afterwards. However, Rus-
so, Johnson, and Stephens (1989) found that simultaneous
verbalization affected cognitive processes and decision ac-
curacy. Further criticism of the thinking aloud technique
concerned the fact that not all cognitive processes can be
verbalized (Harte, Westenberg, & van Someren, 1994;
Westenberg & Koele, 1994). However, if the participant is
given clear instructions to communicate thoughts without
analyzing them, the independence between verbalization
and primary task – that is, the validity of the data – can be
assumed (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). According to Harte et
al., the experimental setting should include warm-up tasks
as well as ensure that enough time is allowed for partici-
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Table 1
List of 12 Scenarios Grouped According to Risk Domain and Type of Risk
Type of risk
Risk domain Normal Medium Catastrophic Global
Health Measles Carcinogenic substances Avian flu pandemic Genetically modified food
Economics/ Politics Borrowing money Stock investments Terrorist attack Globalization
Ecology Flooding Waste disposal Volcanic explosion Extinction of endangered species
The construction of the scenarios followed the examples
provided by Huber (2004; Huber et al., 1997; Huber et al.,
2001). Unlike the published procedure, our scenarios were
constructed in such a way that participants were to make
their decisions on a societal level, that is, not for themselves,
but for many others. This procedure was adopted because
it is implausible to imagine individual damage for the glob-
al type of risk. Each scenario contained a statement that a
negative consequence could result from a selected alterna-
tive, but no exact probabilities were given. The two alter-
natives were presented as follows: A riskier alternative was
presented with a safer alternative, the safer one being con-
nected with further potential negative consequences. Also,
no hints at potential RDOs were given. An example of one
of the scenarios (avian flu pandemic, type of risk: cata-
strophic; domain: health) is provided in the Appendix.
Data Collection
The AIS (Huber et al., 1997) method was used as the fun-
damental technique for information presentation and data
collection. Quasi-realistic scenarios were presented, fol-
lowed by two alternatives as described above. Participants
were allowed to ask as many questions as necessary to make
their decisions. Answers were provided according to a fixed
pattern (see below). Participants made their decision after
having collected enough information. Structuring the situ-
ation is an essential part of the decision-making process. In-
formation is not processed automatically; rather, based on
the search for information, a mental representation of the
situation is created. During the AIS, participants decide for
themselves what kind of information they need. We decid-
ed to use the conversation-based version (C-AIS), which
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pants to familiarize themselves with the task, that partici-
pants do not have previous knowledge of the theory in ques-
tion, and that at least two researchers code the data. Biggs,
Rosman, and Sergenian (1993) as well as by Payne, Braun-
stein, and Carroll (1978) also recommend combining AIS
and thinking aloud in order to construct detailed models of
decision-making behavior. Combining the C-AIS and the
thinking-aloud technique allowed us to collect data on the
importance of the information that the participants re-
quested (Williamson et al.). Therefore, the instruction for
thinking aloud should increase the validity of the verbal da-
ta as an indicator of the thinking process. 
Finally, in accordance with Williamson et al. (2000) as
well as Huber and Huber (2003), a post-decision interview
was conducted to assess the validity and internal consis-
tency of the data collected during the decision process. To
this end, participants were asked to give a retrospective re-
port about their decision-making process (Ericsson & Si-
mon, 1980). At the end of the study, they were asked to com-
plete a questionnaire in which they described in their own
words and for each of the scenarios how they had made their
decision. This information was used to determine the rele-
vance for the decision maker of the different categories of
information. Demographic data (age, sex, profession) were
also collected.
Procedure
Interviews were conducted individually in a quiet room, in
most cases, at the Institute of Psychology at the University
of Heidelberg, but some participants were interviewed at
home. All interviews were recorded with a digital voice
recorder and transcribed afterwards. Breaks and distur-
bances (e.g., by mobile phones) were reduced to a mini-
mum. If they could not be avoided completely, the inter-
view was briefly interrupted and continued after a short
break. None of the participants cancelled the interview or
refused to answer the final questionnaire. The interviews
normally took approximately 45 min.
After participants were welcomed, the procedure for the
study was explained and written consent to recording and
subsequent anonymous analysis of their interviews sought.
Participants received specific information about the proce-
dure in written form and were asked to read the description
of the first scenario, obtain further information by posing
questions and receiving answers from the interviewer, and
to verbalize the statements important for their decision mak-
ing using the thinking aloud technique. A sample scenario
called “railway club” was used as a warm-up task so that
participants could become acquainted with the interview
situation and practice asking questions and thinking aloud.
The sample scenario was not used to collect data. Voice
recording started as soon as participants stated that they had
read the text and were ready to ask questions and think
aloud. After participants had given their final decision con-
cerning the central issue of the scenario (see Appendix for
an example), voice recording was stopped and the next sce-
nario presented. Finally, participants were to describe in
their own words how they had arrived at their decision for
each of the three scenarios. They were also to inform the
experimenter about any previous knowledge they had had
about the scenarios. At the end of the interviews, partici-
pants were given the chance to ask questions about the aims
of our study.
Quantitative Content Analysis 
The first step was the development of a category system to
transform the interview data into quantitative data for analy-
sis. Our category system was based on Huber et al. (1997)
and Huber et al. (2001). Their system consists of the fol-
lowing categories: “situation,” “probabilities,” “secure/in-
secure consequences,” “evaluation,” “long-term plans,”
“RDO,” and “information about RDO”. This system was
used as a basic framework and was modified in the course
of our analysis (see Table 2). We added the categories “back-
ground knowledge,” “experience,” and “attitude/rules/prin-
ciples.” We did not use the categories long-term plans and
evaluation because they were irrelevant for our question and
could also be represented in the attitude categories. In the
coding system used by Huber and his colleagues, a differ-
entiation between insecure and secure consequences was
made. We named this category “negative and positive con-
sequences.” This allowed us to measure the advantages and
disadvantages connected with the risk. All participants’
questions and statements during the interviews as well as
all written explanations from the post-decision interview
were coded according to this category system.
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Reliability Check
Sixty interviews were randomly chosen to determine inter-
rater reliability. There were two coders per interview. The
results showed high interrater reliability (κ = 0.94) as cal-
culated using the conventional method (Cohen, 1960). This
demonstrated that both the categories of questions used and
the thinking-aloud data had been classified with high reli-
ability. The remaining 60 interviews were coded by two
coders (30 interviews each).
Statistical Data Analysis
Data analysis of the effects of type of risk and risk domain
as well as their interaction was done simultaneously by
means of logit analysis. Logit models are special cases of
log-linear models that are used for multivariate analysis of
nominal-scale or categorical data. Natural logarithms of ob-
served frequencies in the different fields of a multidimen-
sional contingency table were computed and expressed as
a linear combination of main and interaction effects. 
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Logit analyses describe a direct relation between inde-
pendent and dependent variables. The aim of the estimation
of multiple influence factors (type of risk and risk domain)
is to make their specific effects visible (Urban, 1993). For
example, the natural logarithm of the ratio between the fre-
quencies of both categories of dependent variables (no vs.
at least one question or statement concerning new alterna-
tives, possibilities for control, or worst-case plans) are rep-
resented as a sum of effect parameters (λ coefficients) un-
der the influence of selected categories of independent
variables (e.g., of the interaction between the normal type
of risk and the risk domain of politics). The explained quan-
tities are therefore not the cell frequencies themselves, but
the ratio between two probabilities of specific expressions
of variables, so-called “odds ratios” (Andreß, Hagenaars,
& Kühnel, 1997).
This way, the directed hypotheses regarding the influ-
ence of type of risk as well as other possible differences in
the search for RDOs could be tested. Based on the compu-
tation of λ coefficients, the rank order of the influence fac-
tors type of risk, risk domain, and interaction on the influ-
ence of the three RDOs new alternatives, possibilities for
control, and worst-case plans was computed. The estima-
tion of parameters and effect sizes from the logit model is
based on maximum likelihood. Using one-dimensional χ2
tests, the frequency distributions of different variables like
background knowledge, attitude, situation, probability, and
positive and negative consequences were analyzed in rela-
tion to the four types of risks.
Results
Mean frequencies can be misleading if one participant asks
a lot of questions in one category and other participants ask
no questions at all (see Huber et al., 2001). Therefore, we
counted the number of participants with at least one state-
ment or question in a given category.
Data Analysis Based on Logits
First, we specified a model which identified the main ef-
fects of type of risk and risk domain as well as the interac-
tions between them. The resulting Pearson χ2 (p = 0.64) and
the likelihood ratio (p = 0.34) showed that the observed and
expected values were congruent. Thus, the specified mod-
el can be used to explain our data.
Testing for risk specificity of active risk defusing re-
vealed a significant negative λ coefficient for possibilities
for control and worst-case plans for normal risks: λ = –0.85,
p < 0.05. For normal risks, fewer participants formulated
questions or statements for possibilities for control and
worst-case plans than for new alternatives. For medium
Swiss J Psychol 67 (1), © 2008 by Verlag Hans Huber, Hogrefe AG, Bern
Table 2
Explanation of Coding Categories Shown With Examples From the Scenario “Avian Flu Pandemic” (see Appendix)
Category Explanation Example
Situation Information regarding the decision “How many people are already affected in
situation. Germany?”
Background knowledge and Background information, which does not “To my knowledge, the quarantine measure
experiences refer directly to the decision situation / are much better nowadays than in times of
is not derived from the scenario. former epidemics.”
Probabilities Likelihood of an event or prognosis for the “How probable are the brain-related side
event. effects of the vaccine?”
Negative consequences (extent of Negative consequences for choosing a “What brain-related side effects are we 
damage / costs) particular alternative. dealing with?”
Positive consequences (advantages / Positive consequences for choosing a “Would a quarantine be cheaper as compared 
utility / benefit) particular alternative. to a vaccine / treatment of the side effects?”
New alternatives Options that point to the investigation of “Are there any alternative precautions, for 
additional alternatives. example, a vaccination against the influenza
virus or masks?”
Control Control of the event or the negative “Could the danger of side effects be reduced, 
consequence. for example, by administering additional
medicine?”
Worst-case plans Anything that can be done in case of “Could they treat the side effects in the brain 
negative events. if necessary? Are they reversible?”
Information about RDO Receive more information about the RDO. “How would they treat the side effects in the
brain?”
Attitudes / rules / principles Statements concerning the content of a “Basically, I am not in favor of mass 
scenario. Personal attitudes. vaccination.”
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risks, a significant positive λ coefficient was found for new
alternatives: λ = 1.39, p < 0.05. In accordance with our ex-
pectation, more participants formulated questions and state-
ments corresponding to new alternatives than for the other
two RDOs.
For catastrophes, a significant positive λ coefficient of
1.19 (p < 0.05) was found for new alternatives. Contrary to
our expectation, the number of persons with questions or
statements corresponding to this RDO was higher than for
worst-case plans (λ = 1.01, ns).
For global risks, a significant λ coefficient of 1.61 (p <
0.05) was found for possibilities for control. In line with ex-
pectations, most participants produced at least one question
or statement concerning this RDO.
λ coefficients of the different RDOs are shown in Fig-
ure 1, separated according to the four types of risks. Even
if the results are not consistent with the hypotheses in every
respect, there are still significant differences in the interest
in various kinds of RDOs used for different risks. There-
fore, we accept the general hypothesis of risk specificity of
RDOs.
risk (λ = 1.01; p < 0.05). Moreover, the interactions between
risk and contents in relation to RDOs are interesting (as the
following three parameters were redundant in the log lin-
ear model, no probabilities will be given). New alternatives
(λ = 6.24) and possibilities for control (λ = 7.18) were most
often produced under the combination of global risk in the
ecology domain. Worst-case plans were most often men-
tioned in the ecology domain (λ = 3.69).
In total, there is clear evidence for risk specificity of ac-
tive risk-defusing behavior. The combination of type of risk
with risk domain has the greatest influence on search for
RDOs.
Explorative Data Analysis
We analyzed the difference between the number of partic-
ipants with at least one question or statement in the cate-
gory background knowledge/specific previous knowledge
via χ2 tests. Frequency differences between types of risks
were not significant for this category, χ2 (3, N = 79) = 1.86.
In the category attitudes/rules/principles, a χ2 (3, N = 55) =
15.04, p ≤ 0.05, was significant. The standardized residu-
als for normal types of risk (–2.37) and global types of risk
(3.04) showed that this category was significantly infre-
quent and frequent, respectively, which makes sense: The
more risky and therefore dangerous the decision, the more
attitudes affect decision making. There were no differences
for the category situation, χ2 (3, N = 321) = 1.21. But the
questions on probabilities significantly deviated from
chance, with the χ2 (3, N = 166) = 15.64, p ≤ 0.05, and a
standardized residual of –3.34 for the global type of risk.
Negative consequences were homogenously distributed
over all four types of risk (χ2 (3, N = 323) = 0.43, ns). Pos-
itive consequences showed significant deviations with a χ2
(3, N = 201) = 8.61, p ≤ 0.05, and standardized residuals of
–2.2 with Type 3 catastrophic risk and 2.01 with Type 1 nor-
mal risk. For Type 3, there were fewer statements on posi-
tive consequences, in Type 1 more statements. Table 3 sum-
marizes the result of these exploratory research questions. 
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Figure 1. λ coefficients for the three types of risk-defusing ope-
rators new alternatives, possibilities for control, and worst-case
plans; separated for the four types of risk (normal, medium, cata-
strophic, and global).
In addition, we investigated for which type of risk a giv-
en type of RDO received the most questions: New alterna-
tives was the most frequent for medium risk (λ = 1.39; p <
0.05), possibilities for control most frequent for global risk




























Participants’ tendency to choose the more risky option
decreased as type of risk increased. For normal risks, 71%
chose the more risky option as compared with 58% for medi-
um risks, 56% for catastrophic risks, and only 37% for glob-
al risks (χ2 (3, N = 222) = 10.61, p ≤ 0.05).
Discussion
Risk Specificity of Active Risk-Defusing
Behavior
The main question of our study was related to the existence
of RDO and their connection to different types of risk. We
will start the discussion with our hypotheses concerning
these relationships. For the normal type of risk, good un-
derstanding and management of these risks did not lead to
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an equally distributed exploration of the different RDO op-
tions, but decision makers, as for the medium type of risk,
looked more intensively for new alternatives, in other
words, they went beyond the given frame of reference. It
might be that the normal type of risk with its combination
of classification criteria does not differ enough from the
medium type of risk. For the medium type of risk, most
questions and statements were about new alternatives. We
are not sure if this result can be interpreted as a phenome-
non specific for the medium type of risk because according
to the logit analysis, the catastrophic and global types of
risk also had a similar influence on new alternatives. Ac-
cording to Huber et al. (2001), new alternatives is the most
prominent risk-handling behavior. Therefore, our reported
result may be less due to the influence of the medium type
of risk but more a consequence of this RDO working as a
“general-purpose strategy.”
For the catastrophic type of risk, logit analysis shows a
significant positive influence on worst-case plans, but at the
same time the influence on new alternatives is stronger. In
comparison to other types of risk, worst-case plans are the
most frequently mentioned here. With a high extent of dam-
age and short delay of effects, decision makers seem to want
to reduce the consequences of damage beforehand. Instead
of possibilities for control, which is used least frequently,
new alternatives (the general-purpose strategy) is searched
for. It might be that worst-case plans are searched for in cas-
es in which no adequately evaluated new alternatives are
available. Participants may have tried to generate at least a
plan for the catastrophe. This explanation supports our as-
sumption that worst-case plans might be one way of risk-
defusing in catastrophic risks. 
For the global type of risk, the results of the logit analy-
sis follow our expectations that possibilities for control is
the most frequently used RDO. No other type of risk had
such a strong influence on it. Why is the global type of risk
so strongly related to it? First, one can assume that the con-
trol of global risks is the only “correct” risk-specific pref-
erence (a normative solution). Second, it could be caused
by the construction of the scenarios. In our pilot study, we
found that global risks were evaluated most coherently ac-
cording to the evaluation criteria. It could be that global risk
is the most homogenous type of risk in the present study.
Altogether, there are obvious aspects of risk type specifici-
ty, but other factors (risk domain, interaction) were also in-
fluential.
Consequences for Active Risk-Defusing
Behavior
The results for the influence of risk domains and the inter-
action between risk domains and types of risk demonstrate
strong effects on the number of questions and statements
concerning different RDOs. We interpret these results as
support for domain-specific effects. Those effects are in line
with the results reported by Huber et al. (2001), Huber and
Macho (2003), and Payne et al. (1993) on risk domain-spe-
cific decision behavior.
The main difference between the present study and oth-
ers can be seen in a comparison of the effects of different
factors on RDOs. The interaction between type of risk and
risk domain is especially important for the frequent use of
new alternatives and possibilities for control because it de-
pends on the specific scenario. Most worst-case plans are
found in the risk domain of ecology, however. The connec-
tion between RDO search processes and clearly defined
types of risk allows a specification and extension of the ap-
proach to RDOs: The scope of this approach could be ex-
tended from everyday risk up to more global risks used in
our scenarios.
Exploratory Research Questions
The exploratory questions were analyzed with respect to
risk-specific frequency distributions. The results allow the
following conclusions: Attitudes, values, and principles are
mentioned significantly more often for global risks. This is
a plausible procedure: The evaluation of global risks, which
cannot be assessed for long-term effects, relies more strong-
ly on general individual attitudes, principles, and rules than
any other type of risk. For questions from the situation cat-
egory, there are no significant differences between the types
of risk. This implies that, for all four types of risk, situation
influences will be checked in a similar way. Nearly all par-
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Table 3
Number of People Asking at Least One Question for Each Category and Risk Type
Type of risk
Category Norm med cat glob χ2(3) value
Background knowledge / experience 18 24 16 21 1.86
Attitude / rules / principles 5 12 13 25 15.04*
Situation 82 85 82 72 1.21
Probability 53 45 48 20 15.64*
Negative consequences 82 81 76 84 0.43
Positive consequences 62 42 38 59 8.61*
Note. *p < 0.05. Type of risk: norm = normal, med = medium, cat = catastrophic, glob = global.
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ticipants requested information about positive and negative
consequences. This seems to be a result of the construction
of the scenarios and from the general understanding of risks.
Cost-benefit notions can be seen as an elementary part of
decision making, and this seems to be quite independent of
the type of risk with the exception of normal and global
risks, for which negative consequences were more impor-
tant.
Significantly more participants asked questions about
positive consequences for normal risks than for any other
type of risk. This over-representation of the normal type of
risk seems to be consistent with the possible outcomes of
these risks. In the normal area, decision makers want to
know about the positive chances that are inherent in the
risks. This “looking for a chance” might be easier if the risk
is not as high as other types of risks because of the poten-
tial reversibility of actions. That matches the significantly
smaller frequency of this type of statement for catastroph-
ic risks. For such risks, positive aspects are less apparent at
first glance. With respect to the alternative selected in the
end, a preference for the more secure alternative in cases of
increasing extent of damage and decreasing degree of re-
versibility was shown, corresponding with the classifica-
tion criteria.
Final Reflections
The combination of C-AIS, the thinking-aloud method, and
a post-decision interview was chosen to collect a broad
spectrum of verbal data. The comparison of the mean num-
ber of questions posed and statements made shows that near-
ly half of the verbal information collected came from think-
ing aloud. Therefore, this method can be seen as an
important source of information and as a useful addition to
the AIS. Especially the new category “attitudes/rules/plans”
seems to play an important role in the context of global risks.
Further research using this multi-method approach seems
worth the high investment of time, which is needed for tran-
scription.
The results of the present study do not reveal whether a
specific type of risk would allow the prediction of RDO
variance. Because risk domain and the specific combina-
tion of domain and type are influential as well, it seems
more promising to construct an even more detailed typolo-
gy including formal and content criteria that could explain
variations in decision-making behavior. This is not an ar-
gument against a formalization of risks, but it points to the
importance of a detailed analysis of risk situations. This is
in accordance with the naturalistic approach to decision
making in which concrete situations, partly single case stud-
ies, are the focus of the research.
Some researchers (e.g., Brase, Cosmides, & Tooby,
1998; Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; Gigerenzer & Goldstein,
1996) assume that humans’ cognitive machinery has had to
adapt to many different situations during evolution; there-
fore, no one general, but many problem-specific, adaptive
processing mechanisms have developed. It follows that on-
ly a detailed model, which integrates many problem- and
situation-specific aspects, can map real decision problems.
It remains open whether further factors beyond the ones
analyzed here (type of risk, risk domain, and the interaction
of the two) affect the preferences for certain RDOs. So the
scope of the RDO concept must be more clearly defined.
The intention of our study was to appraise non-experts’ as-
sessment of risks and to investigate how critical aspects of
risks can be reduced. For all types of risk, the decision mak-
ers tried to precisely explore the situation and the potential
negative consequences. These components seem to be an
important condition for evaluating and planning. Sufficient
information could mean a safety for the further handling of
risks. If an RDO is supposed to reduce negative conse-
quences, then these consequences have to be investigated
closely. For practical purposes, this means that the oppor-
tunity of the risk can be used by adequate strategies as far
as a priori calculations are possible. There is evidence that
the frequency with which the more risky alternative is se-
lected decreases from normal to medium to catastrophic to
global type of risks, whereas the amount of detailed infor-
mation about consequences decreases, too, due to increas-
ing complexity.
Well-founded education about risk-taking should be sup-
ported and put in place specifically for global risks with
long-term effects. There seems to be a high need for infor-
mation because non-experts fall back on existing and less
well-founded attitudes (e.g., “I have preferred organic prod-
ucts for years, so I would never support genetically altered
food”). Under the condition of sufficient information, ac-
tive risk-defusing could be supported accurately. The gen-
erally preferred strategy (within all four types of risk) of
new alternatives shows that it could make more sense to
look for new ways – even for risks that are extremely threat-
ening – than to restrict the damage afterwards or before (par-
ticipants often suggested the search for “something else,”
e.g., another kind of rubbish dump, another kind of stock). 
In addition, detailed and comprehensive worst-case plans
should be available for catastrophes (e.g., participants in-
tensively explored information about the side effects of
medicine). Participants showed a good feeling for situations
in which preventive strategies could not guarantee risk re-
duction but where, instead, compensation strategies were
helpful. As for global risks (characterized by long-term ef-
fects), participants proposed that time be used effectively
to create controlling strategies until the triggering event oc-
curs (e.g., they suggested that genetically modified food
should be labeled). In this case, simulation studies referring
to possibilities for control would be very useful for dealing
with complexity and the long-term effects of such risks (par-
ticipants requested simulation studies very often in the in-
terviews). As an aim for upcoming research, such consid-
erations could be investigated in detail to support efficient
risk management.
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Appendix
Sample Scenario “Avian Flu Pandemic”
[The original text was written in German.]
You are a member of the Robert Koch Institute. This is the
central institution of the German government in the area of
disease control and prevention. The Institute has to decide
how to deal with a potential avian flu pandemic in Germany.
Avian flu is a viral illness that affects birds, especially chick-
ens and turkeys. The contamination from animal to human
through close contact with infected animals can lead to a
mixture of human and animal influenza virus material when
humans and animals are infected simultaneously. That is
how the virus can be transmitted from human to human. 
Avian flu, which started in Asia, is now also present in
Europe. The first cases have been registered in Germany.
The situation is problematic insofar as no adequate vaccine
is available. Pharmaceutical companies are working on a
vaccine for humans, but it is unknown if it will be ready im-
mediately in the event of a pandemic. The vaccination has
strong side effects on the brains of people vaccinated with
it. Your task is to decide whether such a vaccination should
be continued in Germany.
Alternative A: You decide to stop the current vaccination
and try to prevent the upcoming pandemic by means of a
quarantine. If this is not successful, the pandemic will start
immediately.
Alternative B: You decide that the current vaccination
should be continued in order to prevent a potential pandemic
as quickly as possible. But, at the same time, you accept the
strong side effects of this procedure and risk the lives of
many healthy individuals.
What information do you need to make your final deci-
sion?
